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Liquidity, according to Keynes, offers a classic example of the fallacy of composition: what
is true for a part is not necessarily true for the whole. The ability to reverse positions and get
out quickly vanishes when everyone tries to do it at once. – Merton Miller (1991).
1. Introduction
There has been considerable attention paid in the recent literature to the question of how
ownership structure, and in particular ownership by large investors, affects market liquidity,
corporate governance and the value of the firm. One strand of this literature has focused on the
tradeoff between the value of monitoring by a concentration of large investors and the cost of
illiquidity of a firm’s shares. Bhide (1993) argues that policies aimed at increasing the liquidity of a
firm’s shares by promoting diffused ownership reduce the incentives for large investors to monitor.
This is because of free-riding by small investors, and because higher liquidity reduces the cost to
large investors of “voting with their feet.” In contrast, Maug (1998) argues that a liquid market
makes it easier and cheaper for investors to acquire and hold large concentrations of a security, and
makes corporate governance more effective.1 A basic premise underlying Maug’s argument is that
concentrated ownership of securities can be reconciled with liquid secondary markets,
notwithstanding the inherent reduction in liquidity that results from blockholdings and a smaller
investor base.
We revisit this premise and provide a new perspective on the ownership-liquidity debate by
studying an aspect of concentrated ownership that has not received much attention in the literature:
the risk of a market collapse due to common liquidity shocks, i.e., liquidity shocks that are highly
correlated across investors, causing a common drop in demand for a security. We argue that this risk
increases with ownership concentration, especially among homogeneous investors. Our context is
the market for perpetual floating rate notes (perps). Perps are floating rate notes (FRNs) of infinite
1

See also, for example, Bolton and von Thadden (1998), Kahn and Winton (1998) and Pritsker (2004).
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maturity, bearing a coupon indexed to a benchmark rate (usually the London Inter-Bank Offered
Rate, LIBOR) and re-set at fixed intervals (usually every three or six months). The first perp was
issued in 1984. Issuers of perps were largely European, Australian and North American banks and
institutions with generally very high credit ratings. Perps were traded in well-organized markets by
sophisticated investors, primarily banks and other institutions. The market for perps grew rapidly
and the volume of perps outstanding reached $22 billion by the end of 1986. Perps traded at close to
par value in the secondary market, which was highly liquid until it began to collapse precipitously in
December 1986. Secondary market prices experienced drops ranging from 12-25%, and trading
volume dried up for all perp issues. While the majority of the perps issued during the 1984-1986
period remain outstanding, the secondary market has not regained its liquidity.
We document evidence later in the paper that attributes the loss of liquidity in the perp
market directly to the concentrated institutional ownership of perps. Until December 1986, the
secondary market remained very liquid despite its narrow investor base. However, once a common
drop in demand across perp investors due to highly correlated liquidity shocks caused significant
losses to market intermediaries and prompted them to withdraw from the market, the secondary
market was unable to recover its liquidity.
Our study provides new insights into the phenomenon of market collapse by explicitly
modeling how correlated liquidity shocks experienced by investors can cause intermediaries to
withdraw liquidity. Central to our model is a basic Walrasian batch market in which risk-averse
investors are symmetrically informed and trade only in response to liquidity shocks. These shocks
have both an idiosyncratic component and a component that is common across all investors, i.e., a

2

systematic component.2 Trading is facilitated by risk-neutral market intermediaries (e.g., dealers or
exchanges) that contract a bid-ask price spread with investors to recover their costs of offering the
market. Liquidity shocks that have a large common component, i.e., are highly correlated across
investors, prevent investors from trading with each other and the resulting drop in trading volume
causes losses to market makers. Thus, the decision by market making entities to offer the market
depends on their assessment of common liquidity risk. Market makers can withdraw and cause
markets to collapse when the degree of commonality in liquidity shocks exceeds a threshold level.
Our implications differ from models in which markets break down due to a worsening of information
asymmetry about asset price fundamentals across market participants. In these models (e.g., Glosten
and Milgrom, 1985; Bhattacharya and Spiegel, 1991), uninformed investors withdraw from the
market for fear of being taken advantage of by better-informed market participants, causing a market
failure. We achieve a comparable result in our model without asymmetric information. This
difference has important ramifications for how a crisis can be resolved. If the collapse is caused by
an exacerbation of asymmetric information, it can be resolved by alleviating the information
asymmetry. If the collapse is caused by a common liquidity shock, however, prices will rebound
only if market participants believe that the risk of a recurrence of such shocks is small. Unlike in
models of rational price bubbles and their collapse (e.g., Kindleberger, 1978; Allen and Gale, 2000)
our model abstracts from agency problems or imperfect information about asset values.
Our model is related to the work of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007), who examine the
links between a security’s market liquidity and traders’ funding liquidity. In their model, the ability
for traders to provide market liquidity depends on their funding liquidity and the supply of liquidity
2

Several recent studies have documented common factors in market liquidity, including Chordia, Roll and
Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Pástor and Stambaugh (2003). However, the potential for
common factors in liquidity shocks experienced by investors to cause market collapse has not been rigorously explored in
the literature.
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is reduced when the funding constraints tighten. Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Gromb and Vayanos
(2002) also develop models where wealth constraints experienced by market participants give rise to
withdrawal of market liquidity. In contrast, the key driver of market liquidity in our model is the
demand for liquidity arising from the liquidity shocks experienced by investors. As the correlation
across individual liquidity shocks increases, the volume of trading declines, thereby negatively
impacting the viability of the market from the standpoint of the market makers who have invested
capital to make the market available. They respond by either increasing their spreads to recover
more revenue (thereby further exacerbating the market illiquidity) or by reducing spreads to
stimulate trading. If neither of these liquidity supply responses bring in the revenue needed to
recover their investment, market makers will stop offering the market.
We find that these alternative explanations do not adequately account for this collapse.
While our model predicts that the market for perps could recover after a number of periods without
an additional high commonality state, a unique and puzzling aspect of the perp market is that such a
recovery did not occur. We attribute this lack of recovery, at least initially, to the unwillingness of
Japanese banks (which purchased the vast majority of perps) to realize capital losses by selling even
a part of their holdings at substantially lower prices to help restore market liquidity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the rise and fall of the
market for perps. In Section 3, we develop our basic theoretical model, which relates market failure
to commonality in liquidity shocks. In Section 4, we discuss potential alternate explanations for the
collapse of the perp market, and provide a brief postscript on attempts to restore liquidity to the
market. Section 5 concludes.
2. The rise and fall of the perp market3

3

The discussion in this section draws heavily on numerous interviews by the authors with market participants.
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The perp market was launched in April 1984 with an inaugural issue by NatWest (Citibank
issued a “quasi-perp” in 1980), and perps were quickly hailed as a successful financial innovation. In
this section, we examine the rise and fall of the perp market, and link its initial success to the growth
of investor confidence about the liquidity of the secondary market for perps, and its collapse to a
common liquidity shock that substantially increased expectations of the reoccurrence of a common
liquidity shock and led market makers to abandon the market permanently.
2.1 The rise
Floating Rate Notes (FRNs), both dated and perpetual, have particular investor appeal due to
stability of principal value when interest rates are expected to be volatile. Issuance of perps was
especially attractive to banks that were experiencing pressures to increase their regulatory capital
during the mid-eighties and saw perps as being well suited for this purpose because interest
payments on perps, unlike dividends on preferred stock, were tax-deductible (IFR, 1987). Indeed,
all issues of perps include a provision that allows the borrower to automatically call the perp if the
tax authorities disallow the deductibility as a business expense. U.S. issuers did not venture into the
market until just before it collapsed, having initially held back due to a presumption that the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) would construe the interest paid on perps as the equivalent of dividends and
therefore not tax-deductible.
Banks sought permission to count issuance of perps as capital for regulatory purposes. The
Bank of England, Britain’s central bank, did not permit the first issue of perps by NatWest to qualify
as regulatory capital. But, in rejecting this request, the Bank of England set conditions under which
a perp could be counted as regulatory capital. The critical requirement stipulated by the Bank of
England was that perps must be automatically converted into preferred stock in the event of default.
Following the Bank of England, several other central banks—including those in Australia, Canada,
France and the United States —established conditions under which perps could be counted as capital
5

for regulatory purposes, making the issuance of perps a feasible solution to the need to increase
regulatory capital. The Japanese authorities were about to authorize the use of perps to meet capital
requirements when the market began to collapse in December 1986.
The challenge in marketing perps was to convince prospective investors that perps were close
substitutes for fixed-maturity, floating-rate notes and money market instruments. Underwriters
argued that the floating-rate feature made the interest-rate risk on perps equivalent to that on any
other floating rate instrument. Moreover, they addressed concerns about the infinite maturity of
perps by arguing that they could be sold any time at a price close to par in a broad, deep secondary
market. Investor confidence in the liquidity of the secondary market was thus key to pricing perps in
line with money market and other finite-maturity, floating-rate instruments of comparable quality.
The initial rapid growth of issues and the decline of spreads suggest that underwriters were
increasingly successful in this regard.
Banks, especially Japanese banks, were eager to invest in floating-rate, dollar-denominated
instruments during the eighties and became the main buyers of perps. Market observers estimate that
as much as 80% of the perps outstanding were placed with Japanese financial institutions. Overall,
banks held an estimated 90% of outstanding perps (IFR, December 6, 1986, p. 3633). They found
perps an attractive way to increase returns over interbank placements (which yielded LIBOR or less)
at what appeared to be little additional risk.
From 1984 to the end of 1986 the spread over LIBOR that perps were priced at steadily
declined to around 10-15 basis points, indicating that prices increased as investors gained confidence
in the liquidity of the secondary market. The spread relative to the LIBOR benchmark seemed
sufficiently attractive to induce some governments, such as those of Belgium, Denmark and Sweden,
to issue perps, although they had no tax or regulatory incentive to do so. The volume of perps
outstanding stood at $3.5 billion by the end of 1984, $16 billion by the end of 1985, and $22 billion
6

by the end of 1986, accounting for 29% and 46%, respectively, of total FRN issuance in the latter
two years (Meerschwam, 1987). Through 1986, nearly 60 perps were issued.
The perp market was a dealer market, which maximized the potential for liquidity relative to
other market structures. The market’s liquidity increased steadily as evidenced by transactions costs
and the size of the standard lot for which dealers would quote a price. By November 1986, more
than fifty dealers stood ready to quote two-way prices for standard lots of $5 million at a 10 basis
point spread (Williams and Hole, 1987). Although volume data for individual issues is not
available, an indirect indication of volume can be inferred from the number of perp issues in the
Euroclear listing of the twenty most actively traded money market issues each month. Perps were
among the most actively traded money market instruments through the first quarter in 1987, with
average aggregate daily volumes of as much as $1 billion recorded by Euroclear during this period.
2.2 The collapse
The success of the perp market was short-lived. The proximate cause of the market collapse
appears to have been a rumor of an international agreement on bank capital requirements that would
require banks to deduct holdings of perps (and other capital securities) issued by other banks in
computing their capital for regulatory purposes. The Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and
Supervisory Practices (Basel Committee) was expected to take the view that the banking system
would be more resilient, and the danger of contagion would be less, if nonbanks held capital claims
on banks. The basis for this rumor was the proposed Anglo-American Accord on the assessment of
capital adequacy. The proposed regulations were officially released in the United States on January
8, 1987, but major banks were well aware of the general outlines of the approach. The part of the
proposal that was of particular relevance to the market for perps was the decision regarding bank
holdings of other banks’ capital instruments. The official release (Comptroller of the Currency,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve Board, 1987, p.7) noted that the Bank of
7

England already deducts such holdings from capital: “...except for limited concessions to allow some
banks to play an active role in market-making in the primary (new issues) and/or secondary markets.
This policy will be maintained. The U.S. authorities accept the principle underlying this policy and
will monitor bank holdings of capital instruments issued by other banks and may, as appropriate,
deduct these items on a case-by-case basis.”
Although the proposed regulations pertained only to British and American banks, the
potential implications for banks in Japan were clear (Wagster, 1996). As one market participant
observed, “The Ministry of Finance in Tokyo must eventually insist on similar provisioning,
particularly if Japanese banks are allowed to offer perpetual debt themselves. That will just about
kill off the market,” (IFR, December 6, 1986, p. 3633). Since the majority of perps were issued by
banks, even the possibility of this kind of change in regulations provided a powerful incentive for
banks holding perps to sell.
On Wednesday, December 3, 1986, sell orders overwhelmed almost all of the core fifty
dealers in the perp market and they suspended normal trading (Financial Times, Dec. 4, 1986, p.38).
The feared regulatory change caused banks (that held most of the outstanding perps) to attempt to
sell at the same time, producing a one-way market. In our model, we characterize this as a common
liquidity shock that affected most holders of perps in the same way at the same time. Although
secondary market trading enables individuals to mitigate idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, the market
mechanism breaks down when the shocks are expected to apply simultaneously in the same direction
for all investors, and that is precisely what happened to the secondary market for perps.
As participants noted in the financial press at the time of the market collapse, “We have seen
the door slammed shut on the only way in which investors can really leave this market—trading
liquidity.... The whole psychology of this market has now changed—it’s never going to be the same
again,” (IFR, December 6, 1986, p. 3632). Along the same lines, another market participant (IFR,
8

January 10, 1987, p. 3) concluded, “The crisis is basically one of confidence, and perpetuals are
undergoing a general re-evaluation of worth separate from any underlying change in the quality and
credit of the debt involved and external influences such as interest rates.”
Ironically, the rumor proved to be false, although market participants could not confirm this
until the Basel Committee issued a Consultative Paper a year later, officially rejecting this
unfavorable treatment of perps and other bank capital issues. The Committee’s Consultative Paper of
December 1987 (p.9) stated: “The Committee carefully considered the possibility of requiring
deduction of banks’ holdings of capital issued by other banks.... Several G-10 supervisory
authorities currently require such a deduction to be made in order to discourage the banking system
as a whole from creating cross-holdings of capital, rather than drawing capital from outside
investors. The Committee is very conscious that such double-gearing (or “double-leveraging”) can
have systemic dangers for the banking system by making it more vulnerable to the rapid
transmission of problems from one institution to another... Despite these concerns, however, the
Committee as a whole is not presently in favor of a general policy of deducting all holdings of other
banks’ capital, on the grounds that to do so could impede certain significant and desirable changes
taking place in the structure of domestic banking systems.”
By then, however, the damage to investor confidence in market liquidity was irreparable.
From Wednesday, December 3, 1986, the secondary market began to collapse. Market makers
withdrew from the market in anticipation of continuing losses. Typical dealer-to-dealer price spreads
increased from 10 basis points to 50 basis points while at the same time standard lot sizes declined
from $5 million to $1 million (Williams and Hole, 1987). The number of active market makers
plummeted from 50 to fewer than 10 by March 1987, and these functioned mainly as brokers—
trying to match buyers with sellers—rather than standing ready to buy or sell at a stated spread.
After December 1986, only perps issued by the British clearing banks made the list of the twenty
9

most active issues maintained by Euroclear. By May 1987, perps had dropped from the list
altogether. In the absence of a liquid secondary market, the new issue market completely
disappeared.
Secondary market prices fell sharply during this period. Figure 1 plots the value from
November 1984 through August 1988 of a price index of eleven perps issued by British clearing
banks. The sudden collapse and lack of recovery of the secondary market is clearly evident.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The events of December 1986 had exposed the narrow investor base of the secondary market
for perps. The episode made clear that the liquidity of the perp secondary market depended critically
on confidence in the breadth of the market -- on the belief that other investors would not change
their portfolio preferences in the same way at the same time. When a liquidity shock affected all the
bank holders of perps, the negative implications of the overwhelming concentration of perps in the
hands of Japanese banks for the prospect of additional systemic liquidity shocks became all too
evident. The absence of any evidence of contagion, i.e., the perp collapse spreading to other
securities markets or being caused by events in other markets, lends support to our view that the perp
collapse was rooted in the narrow perp investor base.
In the next section, we formalize the above arguments and develop our simple theoretical
model to explain how common liquidity risk can give rise to market collapse despite symmetrically
informed market participants and lack of uncertainty about future cash flows. While the model is
motivated and illustrated by the perp collapse, we argue that it is applicable in any market setting
characterized by a significant level of common liquidity risk.
3. The Model
In this section, we present our model and relate liquidity to asset prices by considering a
model where investors receive imperfectly correlated liquidity shocks and then rebalance their
10

holdings by trading in an asset market. We assume that trading occurs in a Walrasian batch market
in which all trades clear at the same price subject to a bid-ask spread. Trading is facilitated by M
identical, competing, risk-neutral market intermediaries (exchanges or dealers), each of whom incurs
a fixed cost of c in setting up the market for each round of trade.4 This cost may be viewed as the
opportunity cost of providing immediacy and is recovered by way of the spread. We first consider
the basic case with one round of trading and then examine a more general setting with multiple
rounds of trading to determine how liquid markets can become illiquid.
3.1 The basic case
There is a risky asset which is traded at period 1 and pays off θ + ε in period 2, where θ is
non-random at date 1 and ε is normally distributed with mean zero and variance vε . Thus, investors
and intermediaries have knowledge of the θ component but not of the ε component. We assume
that there are N outside investors, each with an endowment wi . All endowments are normally
distributed with mean zero and variance vw , and a common correlation ρ . Therefore these
stochastic endowments may be viewed as liquidity shocks which force investors to attempt to
rebalance their holdings of the risky asset in the secondary market.5 The random variables wi are
independent of θ and ε . All investors have exponential utility with a risk aversion coefficient R. In
addition, a linear technology is used to set the spread, so that the spread on an order of size x is λ x ,
with each side paying 0.5 λ x .6

4

Multiple market intermediaries are not necessary for our basic result; it holds even where a single intermediary makes
an entry decision.
5
See, for example, Glosten (1989), Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) for a similar
formulation of liquidity shocks. Common shocks to endowments can be caused by a variety of systemic events such as
tax and regulatory changes.
6
We have adopted this particular formulation of transactions costs purely for tractability, without loss of generality of
our key results. See, for example, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Fernando (2003).
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A key parameter of focus in our analysis is the endowment correlation, ρ, which proxies in
our model for the degree to which investors are exposed to common liquidity shocks. As noted in
Section 1, we suggest that the market’s exposure to common liquidity risk is higher when the
security is marketed to a small group of institutional investors rather than a large group of diffuse
individual investors. From an empirical standpoint, this can happen because institutional investors
engage in characteristic herding (Sias, 2004). Also, some institutions, such as banks and insurance
companies, may be more susceptible to common macroeconomic factors including changes in taxes
and regulations. Finally, institutional investors act as financial intermediaries by pooling individuals’
liquidity needs (Edelen, 1999), which leads to greater commonality in liquidity shocks.
Denote each investor's desired trade as xi . Using the mean-variance analysis implied by
exponential

utility,

each

investor

maximizes

E ( K i ) − 0.5 R var( K i ) ,

where

K i = (θ + ε )( xi + wi ) − xi ( P + 0.5 λ xi ) denotes the investor’s end-of-period wealth and P is the
market-clearing

price

at

period

1.

The

objective

function

reduces

to

xi (θ − P) + wiθ − 0.5 λ xi2 − 0.5Rvε ( xi + wi ) 2 , so that the demand of each outside investor at period 1,
denoted by xi is
xi =

θ − P − Rwi vε
.
Rvε + λ

Let X ≡ ∑ i =1 wi . Imposing the market clearing condition that
N

P =θ −

Rvε
X
N

Substituting from P into (1), we have
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(1)

∑

N

x = 0 , we have

i =1 i

(2)

xi =

Rvε ⎛ X
⎞
⎜ − wi ⎟
Rvε + λ ⎝ N
⎠

(3)

The total expected revenue of the exchanges (or dealers) offering a market in the security
is Γ = 0.5λ E

( ∑ x ) . We know that
N
2
i =1 i

xi2 =

R 2 vε2 ⎛ X 2
X⎞
+ wi2 − 2 wi ⎟
2 ⎜
2
N⎠
( Rvε + λ ) ⎝ N

(4)

Let v X ≡ var( X ) . Then, the total expected revenue becomes

Γ=

0.5λ R 2 vε2 ⎛ v X
2
⎞
+ vw − cov( X , wi ) ⎟
2 ⎜
2
( Rvε + λ ) ⎝ N
N
⎠

(5)

Now, it is easy to see that v X = N vw + N ( N − 1) ρ vw , while cov( X , wi ) = vw + ( N − 1) ρ vw . Thus

Γ=

0.5λ R 2 vε2 ⎛
1 ⎞⎞
⎛
v (1 − ρ ) ⎜ 1 − ⎟ ⎟
2 ⎜ w
( Rvε + λ ) ⎝
⎝ N ⎠⎠

(6)

It is worth noting that total expected revenue Γ = 0 when liquidity shocks are perfectly correlated
( ρ = 1 ). In this case, there will be no change in relative investor endowments and therefore,
investors will not trade. Similarly, in the case where trading costs are prohibitively high ( λ → ∞ )
trading volume will converge to zero, causing a corresponding drop to zero in total expected
revenue.
Since there are M perfectly-competitive market intermediaries in equilibrium and each
intermediary incurs a cost of c to set up trading in the security, then the equilibrium λ must be such
that the zero expected profit condition holds, i.e., Γ = Mc , or that
0.5λ R 2 vε2 ⎛
1 ⎞⎞
⎛
v (1 − ρ ) ⎜ 1 − ⎟ ⎟ = Mc
2 ⎜ w
( Rvε + λ ) ⎝
⎝ N ⎠⎠
13

(7)

In order for a real root to exist for λ in the above quadratic equation, the discriminant must satisfy
the non-negativity condition given by
1⎞
⎛
Rvε vw (1 − ρ ) ⎜ 1 − ⎟ ≥ 8Mc .
⎝ N⎠

(8)

A market will be offered when (8) is fulfilled. Proposition 1 summarizes our key results pertaining to
the likelihood that market intermediaries will offer a market.
Proposition 1. A market is more likely to be offered (a) the lower the cost of setting up the market;

(b) the lower the number of market intermediaries; (c) the lower the correlation of liquidity shocks;
(d) the higher the number of investors; (e) the higher the risk aversion coefficient; (f) the higher the
volatility of liquidity shocks; and (g) the higher the riskiness of the security. In the scenario that is
the reverse of the above features, the market collapses (fails to exist).
It is worth noting, in particular, that the market collapse threshold is lowered as investor
concentration increases, as measured through both the number of investors in the market, “(d)” and
through the extent to which their liquidity shocks are correlated, “(c).” For a given level of
correlation, trading volume and the amount of revenue generated by market makers decline with the
number of investors, making it more likely that revenues will fall short of the level required to
recover the cost of opening the market. This finding supports our argument that the market’s
exposure to common liquidity risk, and therefore its vulnerability to a collapse, is higher when the
securities are concentrated in the hands of a small group of homogeneous large investors rather than
a large group of diffuse small investors. Additionally, for a given number of investors, trading
volume and market maker revenue decline as the correlation of liquidity shocks increases, once
again increasing the likelihood of a market closure.
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The result in “(b),” that reducing the number of market intermediaries makes it more likely
that a market will exist, parallels the finding in Glosten (1989). However, in Glosten’s model the
result is driven by a reduction in the ability of market makers to withstand losses to informed traders
when competition reduces their profits. In contrast, our finding shows that this prediction holds even
in the absence of asymmetric information. In our setting, an increase in the number of intermediaries
reduces their collective ability to withstand a common liquidity shock.
Another interesting aspect of the analysis relates to how the equilibrium spread varies with
the endowment correlation. It turns out that this relation is nonmonotonic. One can see from (7)
that if one transfers the term involving ρ to the right-hand side, what remains on the left-hand side is
nonmonotonic in lambda. So if ρ increases, the right-hand side increases, but a higher or lower λ
may work to increase the left-hand side in order to restore the equality. The intuition is that if the
endowment correlation is high the market wishes to charge a higher spread, but this also has an
indirect effect of lowering each investor's trade. In equilibrium, the net effect on the spread balances
these effects. If the risk aversion coefficient of investors is sufficiently high, however, the first
effect dominates and the increase in the endowment spread increases the equilibrium spread.7 Our
analysis indicates how equilibrium liquidity depends on the degree of commonality in the liquidity
shocks across investors, a parameter that is distinct from quantities related to the degree of
asymmetric information (as in Glosten, 1989, or Bhattacharya and Spiegel, 1991).
We now show that price drops can occur as investors update their priors about the likelihood
of high and low realizations of the endowment correlation. To do this, we calculate the ex ante
expected utility of each investor prior to date 1. We assume that θ is ex ante normally distributed
with mean zero and variance vθ, and independent of all other random variables. We begin by stating

7

It can be seen from using the implicit function theorem on (7) that the effect of ρ on λ is positive if and only if R vε > λ.
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the following lemma, which is a standard result on multivariate normal random variables (see, for
example, Brown and Jennings, 1989).
Lemma 1. Let Q ( χ ) be a quadratic function of the random vector χ : Q( χ ) = C + B ' χ − χ ' Aχ ,

where χ ~ N ( μ , Σ ) , and A is a square, symmetric matrix whose dimension corresponds to that of

χ . We then have
E [ exp(Q( χ )) ] = Det [ 2 AΣ + I ]

−1/ 2

×

exp ( C + B ' µ + µ ' Aµ + (1/ 2)( B '- 2 µ ' A ')(2 A + Σ −1 )

−1

( B − 2 Aµ ) .

(9)

As noted previously, in our case, the wealth of investor i, denoted by Ki, is given by
K i = (θ + ε )( xi + wi ) − xi ( P + 0.5 λ xi ) where xi is given by (1) and P by (2). In turn, λ solves (7).
Since all random variables have a mean of zero, and there are no terms linear in the random
variables, the ex ante expected utility, − E [ exp(− RK i ] is given by − Det [ 2 AΣ + I ]

−1/ 2

, where Σ is

the variance covariance matrix of [ X , wi , ε ,θ ] , and A is –R times the quadratic form implied by the
expression for Ki. The matrix corresponding to this quadratic form is
⎡
R 2 vε2
⎢
N 2 (λ + Rvε )
⎢
⎢ −(1/ 2)vε (λ + 2 Rvε )
⎢
⎢ 2 N (λ + Rvε )
⎢
(1/ 2) Rvε N
⎢
(λ + Rvε )
⎢
⎢⎣
0

−(1/ 2)vε (λ + 2 Rvε )
2 N (λ + Rvε )

(1/ 2) Rvε N
(λ + Rvε )

λ Rvε
2(λ + Rvε )
λ
2(λ + Rvε )

λ
2(λ + Rvε )
0

1/ 2

0

⎤
0 ⎥
⎥
⎥
1/ 2 ⎥
⎥
⎥
0 ⎥
⎥
0 ⎥⎦

(10)

Given that the wealth from not trading is given simply by (θ + ε ) wi , it can easily be shown that the
expected utility from not being able to trade is given by the simple expression

−

1
Det ⎡⎣1 − R 2 vw (vε + vθ ) ⎤⎦
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1/ 2

(11)

We denote the two expected utilities (from being able to trade and not being able to trade) as EU t
and EU nt , respectively. Consider the following scenario. Suppose that the endowments are realized
(and, possibly, the market opens) at time 1. At time –1, the prior distribution of the endowment
correlation is ρl with probability 1- π and ρ h > ρl with probability π . Also, suppose that ρ h is a
correlation level that causes the market to shut down (i.e., violates (8)). Then, the certainty
equivalent

at

date

–1

(also

the

(1/ R ) ln [(1 − π ) EU t + π EU nt ] , where

shadow

price

of

the

security)

is

given

by

EU t is evaluated at ρ= ρl . At date 0, the true endowment

correlation is realized. In general, if it turns out to be the low value, the shadow price will rise, and
if it turns out to be the high value, the shadow price will fall. If ρl is realized, the new certainty
equivalent (CE) is simply −1/ R Det [ EU t ]

−1/ 2

−1/ R Det [ EU nt ]

−1/ 2

, whereas

if ρ h is realized, the corresponding CE is

.

As a numerical illustration, consider the following parameter values: M = 1, c = 0.01, R =
0.2, N = 100; ρ h = 0.9, ρl = 0.1; all other parameters are set to unity. For ρ = ρ h , no trade takes
place. For ρ = ρl , trade does take place, and, from (7), there are two values of λ that are
consistent with equilibrium, 0.029, and 1.35. Picking the higher value, 1.35, implies that the
difference in certainty equivalents (i.e., the change in the shadow price of the security) across dates –
1 and 0 is +3.10 when ρ is revealed to be the lower value, 0.1, and –4.06 when it is revealed to be
the higher value of 0.9. Thus, the shadow price of the security drops (rises) as market participants
discover that the commonality in liquidity shocks is high (low). This illustration demonstrates how
sharp price decreases can occur as the beliefs of market participants about the possibility of not
being able to trade shift over time.
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3.2 Learning about liquidity

The above analysis proceeded on the assumption that market participants had perfect
foresight about market liquidity and rationally incorporated their beliefs in asset prices. Furthermore,
the decision by market makers to open or close the secondary market was assumed to be exogenous
to the model. Next, we focus on the question of how market makers form beliefs about future market
liquidity, and how this process can lead to an endogenous shift from a liquid to an illiquid market.
Since the decision to open or close a market in our setting rests exclusively with market makers, we
assume for simplicity that new generations of traders enter the market in each period while market
makers span multiple periods.
Each round of trade is followed by a period where the security pays off a random liquidation
amount to investors, and after this payout, a new round of trade with a new generation of outside
investors starts afresh. We label each pair of trading and liquidation rounds as belonging to time n.
The structure of security payoffs and endowments is the same as in the previous section, and each
random variable at time n is provided a subscript of n. The variables θn, εn, and win, are mutally
independent. Furthermore, these variables have common variances of vθ, vε, and vw, respectively,
for all n.
In our model, market makers deduce the degree of liquidity of the market by observing
realizations of correlations in past periods. As before, assume that the endowment correlation is
either ρl (low commonality state) or ρ h (high commonality state). Each period’s realization of the
endowment correlation is revealed following the liquidation payoff.

We also assume that the

decision to offer the market is made prior to the realization of the true endowment correlation.
As we demonstrate, when the true probability of a high commonality state is low, a continued
sequence of experiences with low commonality states can cause market makers to underestimate the
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probability of a high commonality state. In our model, market makers update their beliefs in
Bayesian fashion, so that their subjective probability of a high commonality state progressively
diminishes as the sequence of periods without a high commonality state continues. This can cause
security prices to deviate from the level that reflects the true probability of a high commonality state.
A reevaluation occurs only when market participants experience a liquidity shock that turns out to
have high commonality.
Market makers offer markets based on their subjective (uniform across all market makers)
probability estimate of the occurrence of the high commonality state. Under perfect competition, the
zero expected profit condition underlying (7) and (8) above must now hold in each individual period
that they decide to offer a market. At the outset, we assume that the subjective probability estimate
of the high commonality state is low enough for market makers to open the market. The indicator χ t
= 1 if the high commonality state occurs and 0 otherwise.
Market makers form a subjective probability estimate of the occurrence of the high
commonality state by observing a sequence of prior market states. As before denote the probability
of the high commonality state as π, which corresponds to the proportion of states in the sequence
that turns out to have high commonality. The prior probability density function of π is assumed to
be a beta distribution with parameters α > 0 and β > 0:8
f (π α , β ) =

Γ(α + β ) α −1
β −1
π (1 − π ) , 0 ≤ π ≤ 1
Γ(α )Γ( β )

(12)

whose unconditional mean is E(π) =α /( α + β ), where α and β are chosen appropriately based on the
available prior information about π. Lemma 2 provides the result for the corresponding posterior
probability distribution (see, for example, DeGroot (1970)).

8

The beta distribution is widely used to represent distributions of variables that naturally lie between 0 and 1, such
as proportions and probability estimates. See DeGroot (1970) and Guttentag and Herring (1984).
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Lemma 2. The posterior probability distribution after observing a sequence of n + 1 states is also a

beta distribution with parameters α ′ = α + y ; and β ′ = β + n − y :
g (π | χ t − n −1 ,..., χ t −1 ) =

Γ(α ′ + β ′) α '−1
π (1 − π ) β '−1
′
′
Γ(α )Γ( β )

(13)

where y is the total number of high commonality states observed in this sequence.
We will assume that a new sequence of observations begins if the immediately preceding
event is a high commonality state. Proposition 2 specifies how market participants form their
subjective probability beliefs about future market liquidity by observing past liquidity.
Proposition 2. Market makers form their subjective probability beliefs as follows:

1. If the preceding n + 1 events are low commonality states, the subjective probability
assessment after observing n + 1 low commonality states will be:
⎡
E ⎢π
⎣

t −1

∑
τ

= t − n −1

⎤

α
.
⎦ α +β +n

χ t = 0⎥ =

(14)

As n increases, the subjective probability of a high commonality state goes to zero.
2. If the immediately preceding event is a high commonality state, the subjective probability
assessment will be:
E (π χ t −1 = 1) =

α +1
.
α+β

(15)

Note that:

α
α
α +1
<
<
α +β +n α +β α +β

(16)

The occurrence of a high commonality state (HCS) will cause market participants to overestimate
initially the probability that such a state will reoccur. But, if the market reopens, as the number of
periods without an additional HCS increases, the subjective probability of a HCS will decline,
ultimately falling below the unconditional probability. This shift in subjective probability of a high
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commonality state is the critical determinant of whether market makers will open the secondary
market. For convenience, in the ensuing discussion, we will denote as Ec(π) the conditional
expectation of π after any sequence of observations of low or high commonality states.
It is straightforward to modify (8) to define a threshold level, ξ, of the subjective expected
probability of a high commonality state above which dealers will not be willing to make a secondary
market. Indeed, by the law of iterated expectations, observing that E(ρ)=ξ ρh+[1- ξ] ρl at the
threshold expectation of π, and substituting for the expected value of ρ in place of ρ in (8), we find
that ξ =(ρh-ρl)-1[1-ρl -8McN/{(N-1)Rvεvw}].
Whether the secondary market is reopened after a HCS depends on the unconditional
expected probability E(π) = α /( α + β ) of this state . Note that after the first occurrence of a HCS,
the conditional expected probability of a HCS, Ec(π), rises above E(π). If E(π) is sufficiently high,
Ec(π) may rise above the threshold level ξ. As a result, market makers will not reopen the secondary
market. In contrast, when E(π) is low, even though Ec(π) may rise above E(π), it may not rise above
ξ and therefore, market makers may reopen the secondary market. Our theoretical framework thus
shows how investor confidence in the liquidity of a market can collapse in the event of a high
commonality state, leading to either transitory or permanent illiquidity in the secondary market
depending on how the expectations of market participants are changed by the occurrence of the
HCS.
Our model describes how common liquidity risk can cause a market collapse despite lack of
any information asymmetry across market participants or a significant deviation of asset prices from
their fundamental value. This happens, for example, when ownership by a relatively narrow group
of large investors leads to a high degree of commonality in liquidity shocks. While we argue that the
model is consistent with the perp collapse and has relevance for other markets where narrow
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ownership or other factors increase systemic liquidity risk, it is nonetheless useful to consider
whether other explanations are applicable as well. We turn to this question in the next section,
drawing from the available evidence on the performance of the perp market especially following the
collapse.
4. Alternative Explanations and a Postscript on the Perp Market

In this section we consider some plausible alternative hypotheses for the collapse of the perp
market and discuss the lack of recovery in market liquidity. We begin by considering the possibility
that the collapse of the market for perps was driven by a credit shock rather than a liquidity shock.
For example, did the rumored tightening of capital adequacy requirements cause investors to fear
that more banks would have trouble meeting minimum capital standards and thus default on their
perps? We have found no evidence of any price movements in other outstanding securities by perp
issuers that would be consistent with such a hypothesis. Overall, the high credit quality of perps
makes the credit decline hypothesis less plausible and we have not detected any change in credit
quality either immediately preceding or following the market collapse.
The refutation of the rumor notwithstanding, it is possible that the market may have factored
in a higher probability of future adverse regulation. However, there has been no such development in
the 20 years following the collapse. Ultimately, even if there was a reason for investors to factor in a
lower credit quality, this should not have precluded them from trading. This is not what has
happened. Although 47 perps remain outstanding, the loss of liquidity appears to be permanent.
Another possibility is that perps may have been overpriced relative to their fundamental
value prior to the collapse, especially since from a theoretical standpoint it is possible that perps
were more susceptible to mispricing than securities that have a finite maturity. Since all the perps
were issued at par in the primary market and continued to trade at par in the secondary market, such
mispricing, if any, had to have persisted from the outset.
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Perps were priced in the primary market relative to dated FRNs, initially at annual spreads of
20-25 basis points, but since both securities had the same duration (3 to 6 months depending on the
coupon reset interval) and the same initial liquidity, the price differential presumably compensated
investors for the higher holding period credit risk of perps. After the collapse, the annual yield
differential increased by approximately an order of magnitude to around 200-250 basis points. A
spread of this magnitude seems unrealistic for dated and perpetual securities of comparable credit
quality. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that primary issuance of perps came to a halt
following the collapse. Moreover, even if this higher spread was deemed reasonable by investors, we
would have expected to see the market remain liquid at the lower prices. As noted previously, this
did not happen. It seems more plausible that the higher yield spread following the collapse was
compensation for the lack of liquidity in the market, as predicted by our model.
It is also possible that there was information asymmetry pertaining to perp fundamentals
across different market participants, giving rise to the collapse. However, in the case of perps, there
has been no significant information arriving in the market in the 20 years following the collapse
(either pertaining directly to perp cash flows, or indirectly about regulation of the perp market)
which would suggest that some perp market participants had information that others did not have
prior to the collapse. Additionally, the theories of market collapse based on information asymmetry
would predict a revival of liquidity when all the information privately held by investors is eventually
reflected in prices. This has not happened in the perp market.
Finally, it is possible that the perp collapse was triggered by the removal of a clientele effect
(making perps more attractive to bank investors) or an implicit regulatory subsidy (resulting from
banks being permitted to hold reciprocal capital obligations).While banks were the dominant
investors in this market, however, any potential regulatory subsidies (for example, the benefit of
increasing regulatory capital by issuing perps) accrue only to bank issuers, not bank investors. We
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have not found any evidence of a benefit from holding perps that accrues exclusively to bank
investors. Moreover, Japanese banks, which accounted for most of the holdings of perps, did not
issue perps in this era and so they were not beneficiaries of an implicit regulatory subsidy.
Although most of the perps issued during the 1984-86 period remain outstanding, the market
has not recovered its liquidity. Several attempts have been made to restore liquidity to perps (and
arbitrage the price spread between perps and dated FRNs) by repackaging the promised cash flows
as instruments with fixed maturities (Meerschwam, 1987). The basic idea was to add a high quality
zero-coupon bond (an instrument that was all principal repayment with no interest payments) to the
perp (an instrument with only interest payments and no principal repayment) to create a synthetic,
dated FRN that would appeal to a broader range of investors. These efforts have met with limited
success, ironically for the same reason that keeps the market illiquid in the first place: the
unwillingness of Japanese banks to recognize a loss by exchanging their perps at below par value
due to Japanese regulatory authorities permitting them to defer recognition of capital losses until the
perps were sold. Market makers and other potential market participants believed that any rise in the
prices of perps would be swiftly met by sales of perps by Japanese banks and so they were unwilling
to buy. But, so long as perps traded below par, Japanese banks, which were under international
pressure to increase regulatory capital, were not eager to sell below par and realize a capital loss,
particularly since the stream of cash flows from perps was never in doubt.
The collapse of the secondary market for perps caused a sharp decline in prices of 12% to
25% due to the collapse of the marketability premium. Although indicative prices continue to be
reported for most outstanding issues of perps, they reflect sporadic transactions that are negotiated
between the buyer and seller and not prices at which dealers are prepared to trade. As such, they are
consistent with the discount applied to assets in other illiquid markets (see, for example, Silber,
1991).
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5. Concluding Remarks

The perp episode emphasizes the importance of a broad investor base in establishing and
maintaining liquid secondary markets. While the perp market initially became very liquid despite its
narrow investor base consisting principally of Japanese banks, its liquidity permanently vanished
once a common liquidity shock caused market intermediaries to negatively reassess the risk of
keeping the market open.
Our study provides new insights into why markets collapse. As we have shown, markets can
collapse even in the absence of the two conditions that are thought in the literature to give rise to a
collapse: the bursting of a bubble concerning fundamental value or information asymmetry about the
value of the fundamental determinants of asset prices. Our theoretical framework and the perp
episode demonstrate that market collapse can be an endogenous phenomenon, independent of the
fundamental value of assets, but critically dependent on the commonality in the liquidity needs of
the investor clientele that holds the assets.
Our analysis has important implications that apply to the ownership-liquidity tradeoff.
Specifically, we suggest that to avoid market failures of the type that occurred in the perp market,
security offerings need to be marketed to a broad diverse investor base, which would not only lower
the cost of capital by increasing liquidity, but also prevent market collapse and closure of a future
source of financing. This benefit of broad-based ownership has not been previously emphasized in
the literature, and counters the traditional reason for concentrated ownership: that the latter leads to
more effective corporate governance.
While the perp episode provides an ideal experimental setting to analyze the effect of
liquidity shocks without the complications of asymmetric information, it may also seem like an
isolated incident. We would argue otherwise. Ju, Linn and Zhu (2007) document that the U.S.
natural gas market suffered diminished liquidity for about a month when its largest intermediary
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Enron collapsed. This episode is comparable to the perp collapse in the sense that the fundamentals
of the natural gas market were not in question at any time. Volcker (1986) documents an episode
where the U.S. Treasury market underwent a near-collapse in November 1985 when a software
glitch created a liquidity problem at a major intermediary in government securities, the Bank of New
York. A serious crisis was averted only by the Federal Reserve providing an overdraft of $30 billion
to BNY, which was more than 30 times BNY’s primary capital.
One potential limitation of our model is that it does not allow for the possibility of shocks to
fundamentals or for asymmetric information across market participants with regard to fundamentals.
While as in the perp case the trigger for a collapse need not arise from asset fundamentals, a view
that is supported by the growing empirical evidence of commonality in liquidity, incorporating these
elements will provide a richer set of empirical implications and help to strengthen our understanding
of the interactions between shocks to asset fundamentals and shocks to investor and market liquidity.

26

References

Allen, F., Gale, D., 2000, Bubbles and crises, Economic Journal 110, 236-255.
Bhattacharya, U., Spiegel, M., 1991, Insiders, outsiders and market breakdowns, Review of
Financial Studies 4, 255-282.
Bhide, A., 1993, The hidden costs of stock market liquidity, Journal of Financial Economics 34,
31-51.
Bolton, P., von Thadden, E.-L., 1998, Blocks, liquidity, and corporate control, Journal of
Finance 53, 1-25.
Brennan, M.J., Subrahmanyam, A., 1996, Market microstructure and asset pricing: On the
compensation for illiquidity in stock returns, Journal of Financial Economics 41, 441-464.
Brown, D.P., Jennings, R.H., 1989, On technical analysis, Review of Financial Studies 2, 527551.
Brunnermeier, M.K., Pedersen, L.H., 2007, Market liquidity and funding liquidity, Unpublished
working paper.
Chordia, T., Roll, R., Subrahmanyam, A., 2000, Commonality in liquidity, Journal of Financial
Economics 56, 3-28.
Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve Board,
1987, Joint News Release, January 8 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC).
DeGroot, M.H., 1970, Optimal Statistical Decisions, McGraw Hill, New York.
Edelen, R.M., 1999, Investor flows and the assessed performance of open-end mutual funds,
Journal of Financial Economics 53, 439-466.
Fernando, C.S., 2003, Commonality in liquidity: transmission of liquidity shocks across
investors and securities, Journal of Financial Intermediation 12, 233-254.
Financial Times, 1986, “FRN traders struggle to restore stability,” December 4, p. 38.
Glosten, L.R., 1989, Insider trading, liquidity and the role of the monopolist specialist, Journal
of Business 62, 211-235.
Glosten, L.R., Milgrom, P.R., 1985, Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with
heterogeneously informed traders, Journal of Financial Economics 13, 71-100.
Gromb, D., Vayanos, D., 2002, Equilibrium and welfare in markets with financially constrained
arbitrageurs, Journal of Financial Economics 66, 361-407.
Guttentag, J.M., Herring, R.J., 1984, Credit rationing and financial disorder, Journal of Finance
39, 1359-1382.
Hasbrouck, J., Seppi, D., 2001. Common factors in prices, order flows and liquidity, Journal of
Financial Economics 59, 383-411.
27

International Financing Review (IFR), various issues, including July 1987 Special Issue on
Perpetual Floating Rate Notes.
Ju, J.D., Linn, S.C., Zhu, Z., 2007, Price dispersion in a model with middlemen and oligopolistic
market makers, Unpublished working paper.
Kahn, C., Winton, A., 1998, Ownership structure, speculation, and shareholder intervention,
Journal of Finance 53, 99-129.
Kindleberger, C.P., 1978, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises Basic
Books, New York.
Kyle, A.S., Xiong, W., 2001, Contagion as a wealth effect, Journal of Finance 56, 1401-1440.
Maug, E., 1998, Large shareholders as monitors: Is there a trade-off between liquidity and
control? Journal of Finance 53, 65-98.
Meerschwam, D.M., 1987, Schroders’ perpetual floating rate note exchange offer, Case 9-288057, Harvard Business School.
Miller, M.H., 1991, Financial Innovations and Market Volatility, Blackwell Publishers,
Cambridge, MA.
Pástor, L., Stambaugh, R.F., 2003, Liquidity risk and expected stock returns, Journal of Political
Economy 111, 642-685.
Pritsker, M., 2004, Large investors: implications for equilibrium asset returns, shock absorption,
and liquidity, Unpublished working paper.
Sias, R.W., 2004, Institutional herding, Review of Financial Studies 17, 165-206.
Silber, W.L., 1991, Discounts on restricted stock: The impact of illiquidity on stock prices,
Financial Analysts Journal 47, 60-64.
Spiegel, M., Subrahmanyam, A., 1992, Informed Speculation and Hedging in a Noncompetitive
Securities Market, Review of Financial Studies 5, 307-329.
Volcker, P.A., "Statement before the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy of the
Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, December
12, 1985," Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1986, 115-127.
Wagster, J.D., 1996, Impact of the 1988 Basle Accord on international banks, Journal of
Finance 51, 1321-1346.
Williams, R., Hole, M., 1987, Refloating the floating rate note (FRN) market: the view from
CSFB, Journal of International Securities Markets, Autumn, 5-16.

28

105

100

Price

95

90

85

80

75
31-May-91

25-Mar-91

15-Jan-91

7-Nov-90

30-Aug-90

22-Jun-90

16-Apr-90

6-Feb-90

29-Nov-89

21-Sep-89

14-Jul-89

8-May-89

28-Feb-89

21-Dec-88

13-Oct-88

5-Aug-88

30-May-88

22-Mar-88

13-Jan-88

5-Nov-87

28-Aug-87

22-Jun-87

14-Apr-87

4-Feb-87

27-Nov-86

19-Sep-86

14-Jul-86

6-May-86

26-Feb-86

19-Dec-85

11-Oct-85

5-Aug-85

28-May-85

20-Mar-85

10-Jan-85

2-Nov-84

Date

Figure 1: Behavior of perp price index. This figure plots the value from November 1984 through June 1991 of a price index of
eleven perps issued by British Clearing Banks. The sudden collapse and lack of recovery of the secondary market is clearly evident.
However, prices after the collapse are updated infrequently based on the last reported transaction, and may not be current. Data
source: Datastream.
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